"In general, however, the powerful incentives for profit-seeking found within forfeiture current laws is criticized as encouraging inappropriate enforcement activities and detracting from the proper role of law enforcement within a democratic state. The dependency of the police on public resources for their operations is an important check on police power. Self-generating revenues by the police through forfeiture potentially threatens the ability of popularly elected officials to constrain police activities. Perhaps such concerns partially explain the differences in state laws. If the legislators and the public wished for forfeiture to be very easy and rewarding to law enforcement, every state would have low standards of proof, limited innocent owner protections, and all proceeds would go exclusively to the police."

Source

Holcomb, Jefferson E.; Kovandzic, Tomislav V.; and Williams, Marian R., "Civil asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and policing for profit in the United States," Journal of Criminal Justice (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, March 23, 2011) Volume 39, Issue 2, p. 283.